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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-GARNISHMENT OF ROLLING STOCK
OF FOREIGN CORPORATION TO COMPEL IT TO SUBMIT TO
JURISDICTION OF STATE COURT IS AN UNREASONABLE
BURDEN THEREON.
Atchison, Topeka & S. F. R. Co. v. Wells-, Adv. Opinions Supreme Court, page
533, June, 1924:
Wells, a citizen and resident of Colorado, sued the defendant in Texas
for personal injuries sustained while in the employment of the defendant in
New Mexico. Personal service on defendant could not be obtained in Texas,
and Wells garnished a Texas railroad whose line connected with the Sante Fe,
which had in its possession Sante Fe 'rolling stock and which owed to it
large sums on trafflc balances. Constructive service was made upon the Sante
Fe by serving one of its officers in Kansas, and by publication in a Texas
newspaper. The Sante Fe did not appear in the action and judgment was
rendered against it by default. The garnishee's objection to the jurisdiction
was overruled and judgment was rendered against it in satisfaction of the
judgment entered against the Sante Fe.
The Sante Fe brought suit in a federal court in Texas to enjoin the enforce-
ment of these judgments. The bill was dismissed, the decree dismissing it
was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the case was brought to
the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari.
The Court held that the fact that rolling stock is being used in interstate com-
merce does not render it immune from seizure by attachment or garnishment.
That the writ of garnishment is void because it was used to give the
courts of Texas jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which did not own
or operate a railroad in that State, and which had not consented to be sued
there. The seizure of the rolling stock and credits of the Sante Fe for the
purpose of compelling it to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Texas
constituted an unreasonable interference with interstate commerce.
JUDGMENT- RES JUDICATA-DOES NOT APPLY TO SECOND
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BROUGHT ON GROUNDS SIMILAR
TO THOSE SET UP IN FIRST WRIT.
Wong Doo v. United States, Advance Opinions, page 611, June, 1924:
This is a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a Chinese in
custody under an order of deportation issued under Sec. 19 of the Immigration
Act of February 5, 1917.
In the first petition the validity of the order was assailed on two grounds:
First, that the Secretary of Labor issued it without lawful jurisdiction; and
second, that the administrative hearing on which it rested was not adequate or
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fair. The return answered fully both grounds. At the hearing in the district
court, the petitioner offered no proof in support of the second ground and the
Court ruled against him on the first. The petitioner appealed to the Circuit
Court of Appeals, and it affirmed the decision.
Later, the second petition was presented to the same district court. In
it the petitioner relied entirely on the second ground set forth above. The
return denied the charge and set up the prior petition and proceedings thereon
as a bar to the second petition. The district court ruled that the doctrine
of res judicata applied and held that the decision in the first case was con-
clusive in the second. On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the decision
was affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply
to a refusal to discharge a prisoner on habeas corpus. That in those courts
where the prisoner presents a second petition, the weight to be given to the
prior refusal is to be determined according to a sound judicial discretion, guided
and controlled by a consideration of whatever has a rational bearing on the
subject.
The judgment was affirmed, however, on the ground that the case was one
in which, according to a sound judicial discretion, conttolling weight must
have been given to the prior refusal. The petitioner was making an abusive
use of the writ of habeas corpus by withholding proof on one of the grounds
set up in the first petition, and then attempting to use such proof to support
a second petition.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS- OPERATION OF FIRE DEPART-
MENT-LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES.
A peculiar and startling decision is handed down by the Supreme Court
of Florida in the case of Maxwell v. City of Miami, 100 So. 147. The plaintiff
sued the City of Miami to recover damages for injuries sustained when his
automobile, which he was driving, was struck by an automobile used by the
fire department of the city to take officers of the department to a fire. At the
time of the accident, the city automobile was on its way to a fire.
The plaintiff alleged that the automobile was being driven in a wanton,
reckless and negligent manner. The City demurred to the petition, relying on
the doctrine that a municipality is not liable for injuries received by persons
from its agents while engaged in the performance of a purely governmental
duty. The trial court sustained the demurrer but the case was reversed by
the Supreme Court.
Whitfield, P. J., says: "Whether the operation of a fire department by
the city may be technically denominated a governmental or a corporate function,
the rule in this State is that a municipality is liable for injuries caused by
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